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ABSTRACT
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significant impact on the exchange rates. The multivariate analysis, which controls for interest rates
as well as stock market returns in the domestic and foreign country, provides some statistically
significant evidence that the Brexit events impacted the US Dollar/Euro exchange rate as well as the
British Pound/Euro exchange rate. However, when removing the referendum day from the other event
days, we find that the Brexit events had only a statistically significant impact on the British
Pound/Euro exchange rate, while the actual referendum had a statistically significant impact on all
three exchange rates.

Thesis Mentor:________________________
Dr. Axel Grossmann & Dr. Mark Yanochik
Honors Director:_______________________
Dr. Steven Engel

April 2018
College of Business Administration
University Honors Program
Georgia Southern University

1

1. Introduction

On June 23rd, 2016, the British public voted to leave the European Union in a bitter,
highly contested referendum. The vote came in at 51.9% to 48.1%1, initiating a multiyear negotiation process. During this process, the United Kingdom will attempt to revise
its deal for participation with the EU, otherwise it faces a complete withdrawal. Wide
reaching financial, diplomatic and political consequences will likely be seen all around
the globe regardless of whether the UK successfully negotiates a deal with the European
Union, or leaves empty handed.
This study’s aim is to investigate the impact of Brexit related events and
announcements on foreign exchange rates. Whilst this study will not see the conclusion
of the Brexit negotiations, it will focus on events leading up to and following the United
Kingdom European Union referendum, as well as the referendum itself.
The buildup to the referendum had been widely publicized; issues highlighted by the
Leave Campaign focused on national autonomy and the inability to stem the flow of
immigrants from EU countries.2 This anti-immigration sentiment seemed at odds with the
United Kingdom’s reputation as a country “known for the strength of its institutions, the
tolerance of its population and an outward looking and measured foreign policy.”3

“EU Referendum Results.” Electoral Commission | EU referendum results, 2016,
www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/past-electionsand-referendums/eu-referendum/electorate-and-count-information.
1

2

Arnorsson, Agust and Gylfi Zoega. "On the Causes of Brexit." European Journal of Political Economy,
08 Feb. 2018. EBSCOhost, doi: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.02.001.
3

Arnorsson, Agust and Gylfi Zoega. "On the Causes of Brexit." European Journal of Political Economy,
08 Feb. 2018. EBSCOhost, doi: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.02.001.
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Conversely the Remain Campaign focused on the economic benefits of the Single
Market, whilst also focusing their campaign on the British youth. It was also raised by
the Remain camp that any future participation in the Single Market through the European
Economic Area would require the adoption of EU rules without any input into the making
of the rules, whilst also having to pay an annual fee for participation. This would
effectively nullify attempts by the UK government to regain autonomy and control of
legislation.

1.1. Review of Literature
Following the United Kingdom European Union Referendum, the European
Committee on Constitutional Affairs commissioned the Policy Department for Citizen’s
Rights and Constitutional Affairs to compile “…on a regular basis, academic and
scholarly material related to the process of, and the negotiations on, the withdrawal of the
UK from the EU.” As of January 1st, 2018, this list appears broad in scope of topics, but
far from exhaustive. Some of the literature from the list was included in this review,
although most sources within the list were determined to be unrelated. The total amount
of academic Brexit-related material has grown considerably since the announcement of
the referendum and is still expanding. However, it is important to note that the majority
of the literature and discussion associated with Brexit is journalistic rather than academic.
Our review of current literature examines the current research into historical referendum
and Brexit related effects with specific focus on economic outcomes. The time frame for
literature is limited to the last 15 years and exclusively academic articles. The headings
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covered in this review are as follows: historical referendum, future relationship, foreign
direct investment, equity and forex markets.

Historical Referendum
Forecasting the effect of Brexit is difficult given the lack of historical precedent.
However, there is literature that examines previous referendum and the effect they had on
their respective economies. One study to come out of the Quebec Referendum was
Beaulieu et al. (2006), “Political Uncertainty and Stock Market Returns: Evidence from
the 1995 Quebec Referendum.” This study found that the effects varied given the
political exposure of firms, whilst the stock market was indeed impacted in the short run
by the announcement of the referendum result and prior uncertainty. However, these
same conclusions may not apply to the case of the United Kingdom European Union
Referendum. According to Sampson (2017), even cases such as Algeria’s 1962 and
Greenland’s 1985 departure from the European Commission are too far removed from the
current circumstances of UK-EU relations to shed light on Brexit’s impact.

UK-EU Future Relationship
Much of the academic literature compiled as a result of the Constitutional Affairs
commissioning is theoretical and forward looking. This theme is not limited to the
compiled list of literature; most Brexit related academic articles focus on potential future
deals and effects. The relationship between the United Kingdom and European Union
will undoubtedly change and is the main focus of the literature. However, the literature
does not only focus on trade relationships. For example, ‘Consequences of Brexit for
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European Union criminal law’ (Weyembergh, 2017) looks into the significance of Brexit
for “the EU police, judicial cooperation sector in criminal matters and the possibilities for
a future relationship between the UK and EU.” This ‘thematic’ paper is of less usefulness
than papers such as Owen et al. (2016) and Andreangeli (2017). Andreangeli (2017)
stipulates that UK courts’ ability to exercise jurisdiction over future competition litigation
is under threat. Whilst this may have little to no measurable economic effect post Brexit,
there may emerge cases that could cause harm to the UK economy. The disintegration
and lack of cooperation across a multitude of disciplines may be lessened should the UK
remain part of the Single Market, primarily as the UK would likely be required to abide
by EU regulations. Owen et al. examines three potential future UK-EU relationships
ranging from one similar to a ‘Canada Type’ FTA to an agreement such as the EEA. The
paper states each side in the negotiation must make a series of critical choices. The UK
must choose in its negotiations between access to the Single Market and regulatory
control. This will likely shape the resulting agreement to some extent. The paper
concludes that a ‘bespoke Norway’ agreement offers the best access to the Single Market
whilst limiting UK regulatory control, however a Canada-type agreement that better
meets UK political objectives will limit market access.
The literature is consistent in describing a seemingly negative outlook for future UK
trade relations. Comparisons to previous major trade negotiations highlight the
difficulties the UK will face in achieving both its political and economic objectives. In a
briefing paper, Szyszczak (2017) utilizes the example of Ukraine as a potential model for
future UK-EU trade agreements. The research shows that the European Union is able to
renegotiate previous Association Agreements trade deals with its partners, although the

5

agreement with Ukraine allows the EU to set the agenda in terms of legal barriers and the
European Court of Justice. It is unlikely that the UK will accept similar terms considering
autonomy was a major issue raised by the Leave Campaign. In a March 2016 Policy
Paper, the British Government identify three alternative trade options for the UK: the
Norway model, negotiated bilateral agreements and a WTO only model. In the paper, the
huge difficulties in leaving the single market are identified before concluding “It is the
assessment of the UK Government that no existing model outside the EU comes close to
providing the same balance of advantages and influence that we get from the UK’s
current special status inside the EU.”4

Interest Rate Parity
This section examines literature associated with interest rate parity (IP) and its effect
on exchange rates. The interest rate parity theorem describes how the interest rate
differential between two countries is equal to the differential between the spot exchange
rate and the forward exchange rate. IP assumes that capital flows respond to different
interest rates in countries, in particular well connected financial centers. However, there
is little empirical evidence that follows the IP theorem. Sirichand et al. (2015) states that
whilst evidence for the “strong form” of the theorem is lacking, there is much broader
support for the “weaker form” that states “real interest rates converge towards real

4

HM Government. Alternatives to Membership: Possible Models for the United Kingdom Outside the
European Union. Mar. 2016, www.gov.uk.
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interest rate parity.”5 Their paper concludes that it is the reversion of inflation as opposed
to nominal interest rates which acts as the primary cause of convergence.
Frachot (1996) also reexamines the uncovered interest rate parity hypothesis. In
similar fashion to Sirichand et al., Frachot finds that the simple or “strong” form of the
theorem rarely holds under empirical examination. However, a new formulation finds
that the expected future spot exchange is equal to the forward exchange rate, albeit
multiplied by a term premium.

Equity and Forex Markets
This section examines literature associated with currency and equity markets.
Schiereck et al (2016) compares the market’s reaction to Brexit with the past reaction to
the Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy filing in 2008. Schiereck et al demonstrate the
magnitude of Brexit as an external financial shock, as short run drops in stock prices were
even more pronounced than that following the Lehman Brothers collapse. However, nonEuropean markets saw neither a significant shock nor credit default swap reactions.
These findings were consistent across other studies such as Burdekin et al (2017) which
found a 5% drop in global equity markets in the days following the referendum, whilst
the PIIGS group (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) experienced greater negative
turns, likely as a result of comparably high levels of debt.
Most of the existing studies tend to focus on the short-term effects of the referendum
event or speculate as to the potential effects post negotiation period. For example, Oehler
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Sirichand, Kavita, et al. “Examining real interest parity: Which component reverts quickest and
in which regime?” International Review of Financial Analysis 23rd January 2015
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et al (2016) found that internationalized firms were more likely to experience negative
abnormal short run returns on the day after the referendum, but gross internationalization
had little to “no relevant pricing effect in the following days.” Their paper “Brexit: Shortterm stock price effects and the impact of firm-level internationalization” looked
exclusively at the referendum and the followings itself and so is limited in its usefulness.
This theme of short run analysis is found across other empirically based studies making
analysis over our 5-year time period more difficult. (Burdekin et al 2017, Schiereck et al
2016, Raddant 2016).
Our study is different from prior research in several respects. First, it looks at Brexit
related events and announcements over a long period of time (5 years), whereas past
studies have focused on a singular event, most commonly the referendum itself. There is
a gap in the research looking at the effects of wider associated Brexit events and
announcements. Despite a strong focus on financial markets in existing research
(Burdekin et al 2017, Raddant 2016, Schiereck 2017) only modest research has been
done into the effects on foreign exchange rates. Secondly, our study includes analysis not
just of the Pound Sterling to Euro exchange rate but also the US Dollar to Euro and
Pound exchange rates. This is different from existing works that mainly focus on the
effect on the stock market such as Oehler et al (2016) and Burdekin et al (2017).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we describe the History of
Brexit and Section 3 the Economic Impact of Brexit. Section 4 describes the data used in
the study and Section 5 outlines the multiple regression analysis. Section 6 reports the
study’s results and this is followed by concluding remarks in Section 7.

8

2. Brexit History
This section considers the main events of Brexit so far, split into three sections: prereferendum, the referendum itself and finally post referendum. A UK House of Commons
Briefing Paper written by Nigel Walker, released 18th October 2017, details important
Brexit related events, including a Brexit negotiation future timetable. Using this paper
and a series of Google searches we have highlighted those events of greatest importance,
although they may not necessarily be included in our data due to the events’ wider
political significance. For a full list of events used in the study please see Section 4.1
‘Data’.
2.1 Pre-Referendum (23rd January 2013 – 22nd June 2016)
The first public mention of a potential Brexit made by a person of political
position occurred on the 23rd of January 2013, when in a speech at Bloomberg David
Cameron declared his support for an in-out EU referendum for the British public at some
point in the future. However, not until the UK General Election in 2015 did the reality of
a UK-EU referendum re-emerge, when the conservative party pledged to hold such a
referendum in their manifesto - released 14th of April 2015.6
Later that year, following the Conservative Party victory in the General Election,
David Cameron initiated what would become the first step in a negotiation process,
setting out his plans for an In-Out Referendum at the European Council meeting on the

“The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015.” Conservatives.com, 14 Apr. 2015,
www.conservatives.com/manifesto2015. “David Cameron has committed that he will only lead a
government that offers an in-out referendum. We will hold that referendum before the end of 2017 and
respect the outcome”
6
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26th June 2016. However, it wasn’t until February 22nd, 2016 that David Cameron
announced the EU Referendum date – 23rd June 2016.
Several Euro-sceptic groups emerged in the buildup to the referendum. Clarke et
al. (2016) identifies Vote Leave, Leave EU and Grassroots Out as the main progenitors of
the Brexit Campaign. Clarke et al (2016) describes how these groups worked to mobilize
public anxiety on a number of issues, namely immigration, sovereignty and the perceived
economic cost of EU membership. Fears among the British public of the free movement
of EU Nationals grew as plans emerged to increase the EU; Albania, Montenegro, Serbia
and potentially Turkey were potential candidates for EU inclusion. The idea of control
was highlighted time and again by the leave campaign; whether it was control of the
UK’s borders or of its EU expenditure. Vote Leave ran a campaign which stated
(potentially falsely) that the UK would save £350 million a week that could instead be
redirected to the National Health Service (NHS).
The official campaign for remaining in the EU was backed by the Prime Minister
David Cameron, as well as a multitude of trade unions, businesses and economists. Their
campaign emphasized the heavy economic costs associated with leaving the EU, with
George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer claiming that Brexit may cause a £30
billion ‘black hole’ in the UK economy.7

7

Clarke, Harold D, et al. Why Britain Voted for Brexit: An Individual-Level Analysis of the 2016
Referendum Vote. 2016.
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2.2 The Referendum (23rd June 2016 - 24th June 2016)
The United Kingdom European Union Referendum was held on the 23rd of June
2016, with the British Public voting to leave the European Union by a margin of 51.9% to
48.1% - announced on the 24th of June 2016. David Cameron, who had backed the
Remain Campaign, followed the announcement of the result by announcing his
resignation, initiating a leadership contest in the Conservative Party for the role of Prime
Minister.
2.3 Post Referendum (25th June 2016 – 31st December 2017)
Following a short leadership struggle, Theresa May was appointed as the new
Prime Minister and leader of the Conservative Party. One of her first actions as Prime
Minister was to appoint David Davis as Secretary of State for Exiting the European
Union. The first major step towards exiting the EU following the referendum was to
trigger Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty.8 This gave the European Union official notice of
the United Kingdom’s intent to leave the Union. On October 2nd, 2016, in her party
conference speech, Theresa May confirmed Article 50 would be triggered before the end
of 2017, as well as announcing the ‘Great Repeal Bill’.9
However, before Article 50 could be triggered, there was a constitutional question
to be answered in R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, as to
who could trigger the UK’s exit. Gina Miller, the case applicant, brought the case on the
basis that a government minister is “not normally entitled to exercise any power they

“The Lisbon Treaty.” Article 50, www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-European-unionand-comments/title-6-final-provisions/137-article-50.html.
8

9

May, Theresa. "Speech to the conservative party conference." Birmingham (5 October), http://www.
independent. co. uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-speech-tory-conference-2016-in-full-transcripta7346171. html (accessed 9 March 2017). 2016.
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might otherwise have if it results in a change in UK domestic law.”10 The court found its
judgement in favor of the claimant, both at the original High Court hearing on 3rd
November 2016 and at the Supreme Court appeal on 24th January 2017. As such, the
decision to leave the European Union and notify its leadership of such a decision by
triggering Article 50, must be confirmed by a parliamentary vote.
In response to the Gina Miller case, Parliament voted on and passed the European
Union (Withdrawal) Act 2017 - the bill received Royal Assent on the 16th of March 2017.
Therefore, on the 29th March 2017, in a letter to European Council President Donald
Tusk, Theresa May invoked Article 50. In an immediate response to the letter, the
European Council issued a statement claiming that the UK’s triggering of Article 50,
“creates significant uncertainties that have the potential to cause disruption, in particular
in the UK but also in other member states.”11
Whilst not a direct official result of Brexit, Theresa May called an early General
Election on the 18th April 2017. This was then approved by parliament the next day on
the 19th of April by a vote of 522 to 13. The election was held on the 8th June 2017,
however resulted in a hung parliament. The conservatives won the most seats, and on the
9th of June, Theresa May announced she would form a government, with the conditional
support of the Democratic Unionist Party. Prosser (2018) recognized that this election
outcome had resulted in a substantial shift in party support, benefitting the two major
parties - Conservative and Labour. Despite this, it was a poor result for the Conservative

10

R v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union ex parte Miller [2017] UKSC 5.
See for the letter of the British prime minister: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/29_03_17_
article50.pdf. The answer from the EU: EU Draft Guidelines following the United Kingdom's notification
under Article 50 TEU, Council of The European Union, XT 21001/17, Brussels
11
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Party and Theresa May, who had looked to strengthen their position in the House of
Commons going into the Brexit Negotiations. The first round of Brexit Negotiations was
held on the 19th of June 2017, with negotiations reaching its first ‘breakthrough’ in
December, allowing negotiations to progress to their second stage.12

3. Economic Impact of Brexit
Understanding the impact of Brexit on the UK-EU economy is an incredibly difficult
task. Whilst we are able to forecast various different outcomes, it is impossible to predict
the effect of the exact final deal being negotiated as it is yet unknown. As mentioned
earlier in this paper, there is also a lack of historical precedent with regards to a situation
such as the one the United Kingdom currently finds itself in. Sampson (2017) examines
various options for post-Brexit relations between the United Kingdom and European
Union and the economic impact they might have. Sampson’s paper among others
interprets Brexit as just the final deal itself. However, this study considers Brexit under
an extended definition, including the referendum and negotiation period.
Throughout 2016 the UK economy outperformed the Bank of England forecasts
which suggested the economy would slow sharply after the referendum whilst avoiding a
recession. Rather, the economy continued to grow steadily at an average of 1.8%
throughout the year.13 Michael Saunders, a member of the Bank of England’s monetary
policy committee highlights two main factors for the economy’s better than expected
performance. Firstly, the sharp spike in uncertainty and lack of business confidence faded

12

'Breakthrough' deal in Brexit talks". 8 December 2017. Retrieved 9 December 2017 – via www.bbc.com.

13

Office of National Statistics. “United Kingdom Economic Accounts”. Edition 97, 2016

13

faster than expected and was not accompanied by a major deterioration in the cost and
availability of credit. The second reason identified by Mr. Saunders is the fact that the
global economy is doing better, giving a boost to asset prices and business confidence as
well as export prospects.14 It was a similar story throughout 2017, as GDP growth
averaged the same as the previous year. However, this level of growth was interpreted as
‘slow and uneven’ by the Office of National Statistics, despite the Chancellor Richard
Hammond describing it as “very, very strong.” The Office for Budget Responsibility
forecast growth to slow to 1.4% in 2018 and 1.3% in 2019. In an interview the chair of
the OBR, Robert Chute, said these forecasts reflect weaker household consumption due
to higher inflation and increased business uncertainty due to Brexit.15
As a well-developed, tertiary sector economy, the United Kingdom has comparative
advantage in services, most notably financial services. The economy is heavily reliant on
trade with the European Union; in 2015, 44% of UK exports and 53% of UK imports
were accounted for by the EU.16 It is important to note that “Financial Services” and
“Other Business Services” accounted for 20% of the UK’s exports to the EU. Sampson
(2017) confirms that Brexit will lead to a reduction in economic integration between the
EU and UK, the effects of which can already be seen. For example, according to the
Ernst & Young Financial Services Brexit Tracker, 10500 financial services jobs may be
relocated to the European continent by ‘Day One’ of Brexit. This is as a result of major
financial companies forming contingency plans as they potentially face higher barriers to

14

https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2017/ten-months-after-the-eu-referendum-how-is-theeconomy-doing
15
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/Robert-Chote
16

Office of National Statistics Pink Book (Office of National Statistics 2016a)
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entry in EU markets and a loss of passporting rights. In addition to this, nearly a third of
financial services companies have confirmed or are now considering relocation of some
operations.17 The effect of this relocation of financial services companies extends beyond
a reduction in UK financial services offered to the EU, but may cause potential non-EU
clients to look outside of the UK.
Trade is at the center of the UK-EU economic concerns, and is well addressed by
Sampson (2017) in the form of an option analysis. Sampson uses a Pessimistic (UK-EU
trade conducted under WTO terms) vs Optimistic (UK remains in single market) option
analysis to estimate the welfare effect of reduced trade after Brexit. Unsurprisingly it is
the UK that suffers the worst, although the European Union will also suffer but to a lesser
extent. However, some negative welfare effects due to losses in trade may be offset by
potential new trade deals for the UK outside of the European Union. As of yet no such
deals have been made, and post-Brexit the UK will find itself with greatly reduced
bargaining power having left the single market. In addition to this, the UK will no longer
benefit from new trade deals made by non-EU nations with the European Union, such as
the EU’s now confirmed trade deal with Japan.18
Whilst most economic studies of Brexit focus on trade, other areas such as foreign
direct investment and immigration will also be affected. An EY report from May 2017
identifies the United Kingdom as Europe’s top recipient of Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) throughout 2016. However, 50% of investors surveyed expect the UK to become

17

Ernst & Young. “Financial Services Brexit Tracker: Thousands of financial services jobs to be relocated
as firms plan for Day One of Brexit.” EY, 11 Dec. 2017, www.ey.com/uk/en/newsroom/news-releases/1712-11
18

http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/japan/
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less attractive in the long term whilst 31% expect its attractiveness as an investment
destination to decline in the next three years.19 Dhingra et al (2016) identify three main
reasons the UK is likely to experience a loss of foreign investment. Firstly, no longer will
it act as an investment platform with export access to the Single Market, meaning
multinationals are likely to experience an increase in tariff and non-tariff barriers. Second
is the increased complexity of supply-chain management; namely the increased variation
of regulations on component parts and tougher migration controls on staff transfer. The
third and final reason identified is the uncertainty surrounding future trade agreements
between the UK and EU. The UK motor industry demonstrates clearly the effect on
foreign investment of Brexit, as according to Bailey and De Propis (2017) Ford and now
Nissan have already identified a potential withdrawal of investment to engine
manufacturing sites in the UK. As an industry that currently employs 800,000 people20, it
would be a major hit to see the motor industry suffer. Dhingra et al conclude from their
empirical analysis that Brexit is likely to reduce inward FDI flows to the UK by 22%, and
estimate that this could in turn lower UK real incomes by 3.4%.
A major argument of the Leave Campaign was the inability to stem the flow of
immigrants from the European continent. The campaign argued that this level of
immigration lowered wages, whilst increasing unemployment among British nationals, as
well as putting a strain on public services such as the NHS. This argument had some
strength in that immigrants from other EU countries living in the UK tripled from 0.9

19

“EY Attractiveness survey: UK 2017.” EY's Attractiveness survey: UK 2017: Time to act - EY - United
Kingdom, Ernst & Young, May 2017, www.ey.com/uk/en/issues/business-environment/ey-ukattractiveness-survey.
20

Bailey, David and Lisa De Propris. "Brexit and the Uk Automotive Industry." National Institute
Economic Review, no. 242, 2017, p. 51.
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million to 3.3 million. However, “There is a huge amount of research examining the
effect of immigration on jobs and wages (Wadsworth 2015, Portes 2016, Centre for
European Reform 2016, and Dustmann et al 2005). The conclusion of this research is that
the large increase in immigration in the UK has not significantly harmed the job and
wage prospects of UK-born workers.”21 If the flow of immigration were to be stemmed
following Brexit, the UK may see weaker productivity and lower GDP growth. This is
because EU immigrants are more likely to work and pay tax and less likely to use public
services as they are younger and better educated than the UK-born (Dhingra et al (2016)).
The final aspect of the economy examined in this section is the effect of Brexit on
equity markets. On a global scale, equity values dropped 5% following the news of the
referendum result, although have since recovered. Burdekin (2017) found that EU
countries with greater levels of debt (PIIGs group – Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and
Spain) were worst hit. By comparison the UK has a modest Debt to GDP ratio and so the
equity market is better able to recover from such external shocks. However, the long-term
effect of the final Brexit result on stock market indices is nigh on impossible to predict
given the uncertainty surrounding the negotiations. However, it is not unreasonable to
expect abnormal negative returns on companies in the UK should the effect on the
economy be as detrimental as predicted.
In summary, the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union may have
particularly adverse effects on the financial sector, and subsequently negatively affect

21

Dhingra, Swati, et al. Brexit and the Impact of Immigration on the UK. The London School of Economics
and Political Science, June 2016, www.kenwitsconsultancy.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/BREXIT2016-Policy-Analysis-from-the-Centre-for-Economic-Performance.pdf#page=40.
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trade and FDI. Pressure already exists to reduce the relevance of the UK as the main
centre for euro-transactions, although the UK’s influence on these decisions will be
greatly reduced when forfeiting EU membership. As a result of the negative economic
consequences and uncertainty associated with the United Kingdom’s departure from the
EU, we would expect to see a weakening of the British Pound relative to the US Dollar
and Euro. Also, likely to be affected by the level of economic uncertainty is the Euro,
which will remain strong relative to the pound but may weaken relative to the US Dollar.

4. Data (Including Summary Statistics)
The data spans the time period from (1/1/2013) to (12/31/2017) and sampled at a
daily frequency. The main data source for the analysis was drawn from Thomson Reuters
Eikon/DataStream. We investigate the impact of Brexit related events on three bilateral
exchange rates: the U.S. dollar versus the euro, the U.S. dollar versus the British pound,
and the British pound versus the euro. The dollar/euro exchange rate is sourced from the
European Central Bank and coded “USECBP” in DataStream. The pound/euro exchange
rate is also sourced from the European Central Bank and coded “UKECBSP” in
DataStream. The U.S dollar/euro exchange rate is sourced from the Bank of England and
coded “STUSBOE”. We use the change in the exchange rate, which is calculated as
follows:
∆𝑆𝑡 =

𝑆𝑡 −𝑆𝑡−1
𝑆𝑡−1

,

[1]

where, St represents the exchange rate at time t.
The stock market returns for the U.S., the U.K. and the Eurozone are calculated
based on the Standard & Poor’s 500 index (S&P500), the Financial Times Stock Exchange
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100 index (FTSE100) and the STOXX Europe 600 index, respectively. The three stock
market indexes are coded “S&PCOMP”, “FTSE100”, and “DJSTOXX” in DataStream and
are quoted in the home country’s currency. The stock market returns are calculated as
follows:
∆𝑃𝑡 =

𝑃𝑡 −𝑃𝑡−1
𝑆𝑃𝑡−1

,

[2]

where, Pt represents the value of the respective stock market index t.
The interest rates are based on the U.S. 3-month Treasury bill, the U.K 3-month
Treasury bill and the 3-month euro interbank offered rate and are coded, FRTBS3M,
UKTBTND, and FIBOR3M in DataStream, respectively.
A UK House of Commons Briefing Paper released 18th October 2017 details
important Brexit related events, including a Brexit negotiation future timetable. From this
paper 106 events were identified across a 5-year period, running from January 1st, 2013 to
December 31st, 2017. Of these 106 events, 37 were removed meaning that a final number
of 69 events would be included in the study (Table 13). Events were removed either due
to a lack of media coverage, or categorization as a wider political event i.e. beyond the
exclusive sphere of Brexit. This final categorization included events such as Theresa
May’s appointment as Prime Minister and the German general election.
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4.1 Summary statistics
Panel A: Exchange rate changes
USD/Euro
Pound/Euro
DataStream
USECBSP
UKECBSP
Mean
-0.0059%
0.0079%
STD
0.5275%
0.5382%
MIN
-3.6151%
-2.2370%
MAX
2.4970%
5.4246%
Panel B: Stock market returns
USSTOCK
UKSTOCK
DataStream
S&PCOMP
FTSE100
Mean
0.0510%
0.0239%
STD
0.7364%
0.8461%
MIN
-3.9414%
-4.6670%
MAX
3.9034%
3.5775%
Panel 3: Interest Rates (3-month)
US Interest
UK Interest
DataStream
FRTBS3M
UKTBTND
Mean
0.2779
0.3221
STD
0.3630
0.1296
MIN
-0.0200
-0.0300
MAX
1.4500
0.4962

USD/Pound
STUSBOE
-0.0120%
0.5782%
-7.9538%
2.8056%
EUROSTOCK
DJSTOXX
0.0467%
1.1072%
-6.8233%
4.9717%
EURO Interest
FIBOR3M
-0.0364
0.2366
-0.3320
0.3470

Table 1: Summary Statistics

5. Methodology
5.1 Univariate Analysis
For each of the 69 Brexit related events, we calculate the series of exchange rate
changes for the actual event day (day (0)), the series of exchange rate changes for the one
day prior to the event day (day (-1)), as well as the series of exchange rate changes for the
one day after the event day (day (+1)). Since the changes in the exchange rates could be
driven by the Brexit Referendum day, we also investigate all three-series excluding the
window surrounding the referendum day. As a benchmark, we also calculate the series of
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exchange rate changes excluding the event window (day (-1) to day (+1)). Finally, we
calculate the average percent change in the exchange rates for day (-1), day (0), and day
(+1) as well as the non-event window days. A two-sample test, in combination with a
Levene-Test of equal variance, is then performed to test if the changes before, during or
after the Brexit event days are statistically significantly different from the non-event
window days.
5.2 Multiple Regression Analysis
In addition to the univariate analysis explained above, we also perform an ordinary
least squared (OLS) multiple regression analysis. The multiple regression analysis includes
the dummy variables for each event window day, the domestic and foreign interest rates,
as well as the foreign and domestic stock market returns. The domestic and foreign interest
rates allow us to control for the interest rate parity conditions that may impact exchange
rates. Finally, the stock market returns allow us to account for other news events that
potentially confound the findings from the univariate analysis. Equations [3] and [4]
present the regression model:

∆𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝐷𝑈𝑀(−1) + 𝛽2 𝐷𝑈𝑀(0) + 𝛽3 𝐷𝑈𝑀(+1)

+ 𝛾1 𝐷𝑆𝑇𝑀𝑅𝑡

+ 𝛾2 𝐹𝑆𝑇𝑀𝑅𝑡 + 𝛾3 𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝛾4 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
[3]
∆𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝜑1 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑊𝑅(−1) + 𝜑2 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑊𝑅(0) + 𝜑3 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑊𝑅(+1)
+ 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑅𝑂(−1) + 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑅𝑂(0) + 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑅𝑂(+1)
+ 𝛾5 𝐷𝑆𝑇𝑀𝑅𝑡 + 𝛾6 𝐹𝑆𝑇𝑀𝑅𝑡 + 𝛾7 𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝛾8 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡
[4]
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where:
Dependent variable:
∆St

the change in the exchange rate (USD/Euro), USD/Pound, and Pound Euro)
quoted as domestic per foreign currency

Independent variables:
DUM(-1)

is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the days prior to Brexit
related events, and zero otherwise

DUM(0)

is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the days of Brexit related
events, and zero otherwise
is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the days after Brexit
related events, and zero otherwise

DUM(+1)

DUMWR(-1) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the days prior to Brexit
related events but without the referendum event, and zero otherwise
DUMWR(0)

is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the days of Brexit related
events but without the referendum event, and zero otherwise

DUMWR(+1) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the days after Brexit
related events but without the referendum event, and zero otherwise
DUMR0(-1)

is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the days prior to the
Brexit referendum, and zero otherwise

DUMR0(0)

is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the days of Brexit
referendum, and zero otherwise

DUMR0(+1) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the days after the Brexit
referendum, and zero otherwise
DSTMRt

represents the domestic stock market return at time t

FSTMRt

represents the foreign stock market returns at time t

DIRt

represents the domestic interest rates at time t

FIRt

represents the foreign interest rate at time t

β, φ, and γ

are the coefficients to be estimated

εt and ωt

are the random disturbance terms
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7. Results and Discussion
7.1 Event Day Exchange Rate Change
Tables 2-10 summarize the average daily change of the three exchange rates for
selected windows for all of the events examined. Table 2 shows an average change for
the USD/Euro exchange rate of -0.0918% on all event days (Day (0)). The Euro therefore
depreciated relative to the dollar. However, the difference in exchange rate change
between event days and non-event days was not statically significant.
Similarly, Table 5 shows the USD/Pound exchange rate had an average change of
-0.0915% on event days, meaning a relative depreciation of the Pound as expected.
However, the difference in exchange rate change between event days and non-event days
was not statically significant.
Table 8 shows the Pound/Euro average exchange rate change was -0.0024% on
event days. Again, the difference was not statistically significant. The relative
depreciation of the Euro and Pound relative to the Dollar was in line with our hypothesis,
however the Pounds appreciation against the Euro was not as expected, albeit not
statistically significant. With regards to the referendum day, average change on event
days was statistically significant at the 1% level for all three exchange rates (Table 4, 7
and 10).
7.2 Lead and Lag Returns
Next, we examined one day prior to (Day (-1)), and immediately after (Day (+1))
the event days in an effort to measure any expectations before the event as well as any
lagged effects. Table 10 shows the Pound/Euro exchange rate change on the day prior to
23

the referendum was -0.2578%. Arnorsson and Gylfi (2018) examine the currency markets
in the build-up to the referendum. They suggest that appreciation of the Sterling in the
days prior represented the currency market’s expectation of a remain-side victory.22
However, our results show the exchange rate change on the day prior to the referendum
was not significantly different from non-event days. Shown on Table 4, the Dollar/Euro
exchange rate also experienced statistically significant change on Day (-1); the Euro’s
appreciation perhaps more evidence for Arnorsson and Gylfi’s suggestion. There was
however no statistically significant in the average exchange rates for the days prior and
after event days.
7.3 Multivariate Analysis
The Multivariate analysis reveals that daily exchange rate changes cannot be fully
explained by the occurrence of an event day. Table 12 shows R-Squares of 0.04, 0.19 and
0.18 for the USD/Euro, USD/Pound and Pound/Euro respectively. Therefore, the Brexit
related events and announcements better explain exchange rates change for the
USD/Pound and Pound/Euro than the USD/Euro. Plankandaras et al. (2017)23 examine
whether the post-referendum depreciation of the Pound is a direct result of the
referendum result or has other causes elsewhere. Their study found that most of the
depreciation was caused by the Brexit event.
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Arnorsson, Agust and Gylfi Zoega. "On the Causes of Brexit." European Journal of Political (2018)
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Plakandaras, Bill & Gupta, Rangan & Wohar, Mark. (2016). “The Depreciation of the
Pound Post-Brexit: Could it have been Predicted?” Finance Research Letters.
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When removing the referendum from the other event days (Table 12), we find that
the events had only a statistically significant impact on the British Pound/Euro exchange
rate, whilst the referendum itself had a statistically significant impact on all three
exchange rates.
The multivariate analysis, which controls for interest rates as well as stock market
returns in the domestic and foreign country, provides some statistically significant
evidence that the Brexit events impacted the US Dollar/Euro exchange rate on (Day (0))
as well as the British Pound/Euro exchange rate (Day (+1)). However, when separating
the actual referendum day from the other event days as shown on Table 12, we find that
events had a statistically significant impact on the British Pound/Euro exchange rate on
Day (0). The multivariate analysis results on Table 12 also show the referendum event
itself had a statistically significant impact on all three exchange rates.

7. Conclusion
This thesis investigates the effect of Brexit related events and announcements on
three foreign exchange rates. We find evidence in both the univariate and multivariate
analysis that events had some effect on exchange rates. In line with the existing literature
we found strong statistical evidence that the referendum itself had a major impact on
exchange rates. The average exchange rate change on event days matched our
expectations other than for the Pound/Euro, which showed an appreciation of the pound
on event days. The existing literature suggested that negative economic effects for the
United Kingdom will result from Brexit, and so we expected to see an average
depreciation of the Pound on event days which was not the case.
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Whilst the study was able to demonstrate statistically significant exchange rate
changes during event windows, the model lacks utility in analyzing direction of change,
i.e. appreciation or deprecation of currency. At the basic level, we can look at the average
percentage change in the exchange rate; the average change on Day (0) shows
depreciation of the Pound relative to the Dollar and Euro, albeit driven by the
referendum. One of the most noteworthy results from the multivariate analysis arises
when removing the referendum event; the results show statistically significant change in
the Pound/Euro exchange rate on event Day (+1) when compared to non-event days. This
may reflect some lag effect of Brexit related events on the exchange rate.
An opportunity for further study may be to examine events prior to the
referendum and post referendum independently. Differences in average exchange rate
change may reflect changing attitudes towards Brexit. Whilst Arnorsson and Gylfi (2018)
proposed that appreciation of the Pound in the days leading up to the referendum
reflected an expected Remain result, the inclusion of a broad range of events in this study
across a longer period of time makes it difficult to make a similar suggestion.
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6.2 Multivariate Analysis Results
Table 11: Multiple Regression Event Windows from day(-1) to day(+1)
USD/Euro
Coef.

t-stat.

USD/Pound
Prob.

Coef.

t-stat.

Pound/Euro
Prob.

Coef.

t-stat.

Prob.

C

-0.00025

-1.22

0.22

0.00017

0.28

0.78

0.00004

0.09

0.93

DUM(-1)

-0.00095

-1.40

0.16

-0.00108

-1.47

0.14

0.00030

0.46

0.65

DUM(0)

-0.00116

-1.70

0.09

-0.00096

-1.29

0.20

-0.00043

-0.65

0.51

DUM(+1)

0.00015

0.22

0.83

-0.00045

-0.61

0.54

0.00117

1.77

0.08

DSTMR

0.01808

0.76

0.44

0.13822

5.30

0.00

0.21359

7.74

0.00

FSTMR

-0.03537

-2.25

0.02

-0.08239

-3.63

0.00

-0.24246

-11.48

0.00

DIR

0.00113

1.81

0.07

0.00058

1.05

0.29

0.00008

0.07

0.94

FIR

0.00021

0.22

0.83

-0.00116

-0.77

0.44

-0.00055

-0.81

0.42

R-squared

0.01

0.03

0.10

N

1303

1303

1303

The bold values indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
DUM(-1) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the days prior to Brexit related events,
and zero otherwise. DUM(0) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the days of Brexit
related events, and zero otherwise. DUM(+1) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for
the days after Brexit related events, and zero otherwise. DSTMR represents the Domestic Stock
Market Return and FSTMR the Foreign Stock Market Return. DIR represents the Domestic
Interest Rate and FIR the Foreign Interest Rate.
Table 12: Multiple Regression Event Windows from day(-1) to day(+1) separating between
non-referendum and referendum events.
USD/Euro
Coef.
C

t-stat.

USD/Pound
Prob.

Coef.

Pound/Euro

t-stat.

Prob.

Coef.

t-stat.

Prob.

-0.00022

-1.09

0.28

-0.00001

-0.02

0.98

0.00035

0.84

0.40

-0.00071

-1.04

0.30

-0.00025

-0.37

0.71

-0.00021

-0.32

0.75

-0.00084

-1.22

0.22

0.00049

0.72

0.47

-0.00149

-2.31

0.02

0.00054

0.78

0.43

0.00090

1.31

0.19

0.00033

0.50

0.61

0.01013

1.94

0.05

0.00763

1.46

0.15

-0.00141

-0.29

0.77

-0.03126

-5.91

0.00

-0.07896

-14.97

0.00

0.04597

9.23

0.00

-0.00741

-1.42

0.16

-0.03502

-6.68

0.00

0.03139

6.38

0.00

USSTOCK

0.00904

0.39

0.70

0.09898

4.14

0.00

0.20620

7.80

0.00

EUROSTOCK

-0.04743

-3.03

0.00

-0.09933

-4.79

0.00

-0.21235

-10.41

0.00

USIR

0.00094

1.52

0.13

0.00017

0.33

0.74

-0.00073

-0.63

0.53

EUROIR

0.00012

0.13

0.90

-0.00049

-0.36

0.72

-0.00068

-1.05

0.29

DUMWR(-1)
without Referendum
DUMWR(0)
without Referendum
DUMWR(+1)
without Referendum
DUMRO(-1)
Referendum only
DUMRO(0)
Referendum only
DUMRO(+1)
Referendum only

R-squared

0.04

0.19

0.18

N

1303

1303

1303

The bold values indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
DUMWR(-1) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the days prior to Brexit related
events but without the referendum event, and zero otherwise. DUMWR(0) is a dummy variable
that takes the value of one for the days of Brexit related events but without the referendum event,
and zero otherwise. DUMWR(+1) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the days
after Brexit related events but without the referendum event, and zero otherwise. DUMR0(-1) is a
dummy variable that takes the value of one for the days prior to the Brexit referendum, and zero
otherwise. DUMR0(0) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the days of Brexit
referendum, and zero otherwise. DUMR0(+1) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for
the days after the Brexit referendum, and zero otherwise. DSTMR represents the Domestic Stock
Market Return and FSTMR the Foreign Stock Market Return. DIR represents the Domestic
Interest Rate and FIR the Foreign Interest Rate.
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Table 13: Event Date and Description
Date

Event Description

1/23/13

In a speech at Bloomberg, Prime Minister David Cameron discusses the future of the European Union
and declares he is in favor of an in-out referendum in the future on the basis of a new settlement for the
UK in the EU.
Launch of the Conservative Party Manifesto for the 2015 General Election. This pledges “Real change
in our relationship with the European Union” and commits to “hold an in-out referendum on our
membership of the EU before the end of 2017.”
Meeting of the European Council. Here, the Prime Minister sets out his plans for an in-out referendum.
It is the first step in the negotiation process and the European Council agrees to return to the issue in
December.
European Council meeting.
The Prime Minister makes a statement to Parliament on the previous week’s European Council
meeting. He sets out the four things he needs to achieve for the UK’s renegotiation package in the areas
of economic governance, competitiveness, sovereignty and social benefits and free movement
David Cameron delivers a speech on Europe to Chatham House, setting out the case for EU reform and
reaffirming his commitment to an EU referendum before the end of 2017.
The European Union Referendum Act receives Royal Assent. This provides for the holding of a
referendum in the UK and Gibraltar on whether the UK should remain a member of the EU
Donald Tusk writes to Members of the European Council on his proposal for a new settlement for the
UK within the EU. The European Council publishes its Draft Decision concerning a ‘New Settlement
for the United Kingdom within the European Union’.
The Prime Minister gives a statement to the House of Commons on the progress made regarding the
UK-EU renegotiation.
Following the meeting of the European Council, David Cameron gives a statement outlining his
negotiations to secure a deal giving the UK special status in the EU.
The Prime Minister announces the EU referendum date – 23 June 2016 – after securing a deal on
Britain's membership of the EU. The government publishes The best of both worlds: the United
Kingdom’s special status in a reformed European Union. In the House of Commons, David Cameron
makes a statement on the UK’s new special status in the EU and announces the date of the referendum

4/14/15

6/25/15

10/15/15
10/19/15

11/10/15
12/17/15
2/2/16

2/3/16
2/19/16
2/22/16

6/23/16
6/24/16

6/27/16
7/20/16
8/13/16
9/5/16
10/2/16

10/4/16

10/18/16

The UK holds a referendum on its membership of the EU. The question posed to the electorate:
“Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?”
Result of the referendum is announced, with the majority of voters choosing to leave the EU. The
referendum results are: Remain: 16,141,241 (48.1%) Leave: 17,410,742 (51.9%) In a statement outside
10 Downing St, Prime Minister David Cameron announces his resignation, though will stay in office
until a new leader is in place, which should be by the Conservative Party Conference in October. EU
leaders and the Netherlands EU Presidency release a statement on the outcome of the UK referendum.
David Cameron gives a statement to the House of Commons on the outcome of the EU Referendum.
Speaking to the President of the European Council, Theresa May suggests that the UK relinquishes the
rotating Presidency of the Council, scheduled for the second half of 2017.
Chancellor Philip Hammond guarantees EU funding beyond the date the UK leaves the EU
David Davis makes a statement to the House of Commons, explaining the work of the Department for
Exiting the European Union.
In her speech to the Conservative Party Conference, the Prime Minister announces a ‘Great Repeal
Bill’ to repeal the European Communities Act 1972. In the same speech the Prime Minister confirms
that she will trigger Article 50 before the end of March 2017 and declares: “It is not up to the House of
Commons to invoke Article 50, and it is not up to the House of Lords. It is up to the Government to
trigger Article 50 and the Government alone”.
The High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland hears a legal challenge to Brexit. The question for the
court is whether the UK Government needs the consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly to leave the
EU.
The High Court hears the Gina Miller case: judicial review proceedings challenging the legality of the
UK Government’s proposed use of prerogative powers to give notice of intention to leave the EU under
Article 50.
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10/21/16

European Council meeting. At the end of the session, Theresa May gives a statement regarding the
subjects covered in the meeting and takes questions.

10/28/16

The High Court in Northern Ireland rules in favor of the UK Government, following the court case
heard on 4 October

11/3/16

The High Court gives its judgment in R (Gina Miller & Dos Santos) v Secretary of State for Exiting the
European Union. The Court finds in favor of the claimants and rules the Government cannot, according
to the UK’s constitutional law, use prerogative powers to give the notice required by Article 50 TEU to
withdraw from the European Union. The Government says it will appeal against the decision and is
granted permission to “leapfrog” the Court of Appeal and go directly to the Supreme Court. The
Government maintains its intention to stick to the March 2017 timetable for Article 50 to be invoked.
David Davis gives a Statement to the House of Commons on the process for invoking Article 50
Alex Ellis, the current British Ambassador to Brazil, is appointed Director General at the Department
for Exiting the European Union and will take up his position in January 2017.
The UK’s Supreme Court hears the Government’s appeal against the High Court ruling that Parliament
must vote on whether Article 50 can be triggered. For the first time ever, the Supreme Court sits en
banc, meaning that all sitting justices hear the case. (7th December) The House of Commons vote on
respecting the outcome of the referendum is passed by a large majority.
Sir Ivan Rogers, the UK Permanent Representative to the EU, resigns.

11/7/16
11/24/16
12/8/16

1/3/17
1/4/17
1/17/17

1/24/17

1/26/17

2/1/17
2/2/17

2/8/17
3/13/17
3/14/17
3/16/17

3/20/17

Sir Tim Barrow is appointed as UK Permanent Representative to the EU, taking up the role the
following week.
In a speech at Lancaster House the Prime Minister sets out the government’s ‘Plan for Britain’ – the
plan for leaving the EU – which includes 12 priorities that the UK Government will use to negotiate
Brexit: The government’s negotiating objectives for exiting the EU.
The Supreme Court rejects (by a majority of 8 to 3) the Government’s appeal against the November
2016 High Court ruling and states that Ministers “require the authority of primary legislation” in order
to give the Article 50 notice. On the devolution questions raised, the Court unanimously holds that the
UK Parliament is not legally required to seek consent from the devolved legislatures. Responding to
the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Government issues the following statement: “The British people voted
to leave the EU, and the government will deliver on their verdict – triggering Article 50, as planned, by
the end of March. Today’s ruling does nothing to change that. It’s important to remember that
Parliament backed the referendum by a margin of 6 to 1 and has already indicated its support for
getting on with the process of exit to the timetable we have set out. We respect the Supreme Court’s
decision, and will set out our next steps to Parliament shortly”. David Davis gives a statement to the
House of Commons on Article 50, in response to the judgment by the Supreme Court.
With legislation, a requirement following the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Government publishes a
draft Bill that will allow the UK to start the process of leaving the EU: The European Union
(Notification of Withdrawal) Bill.
The European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill passes its Second Reading in the House of
Commons by 498 votes to 114.
The Government publishes its Brexit White Paper, formally setting out its strategy for exiting the EU:
The United Kingdom’s exit from, and new partnership with, the European Union. Following
publication of the Brexit White Paper, David Davis gives a statement to the House of Commons.
The European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill passes its Third Reading in the House of
Commons, by 494 votes to 122. The Bill now moves to the House of Lords.
Parliament passes the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill.
Theresa May gives a statement to Parliament on the March European Council meeting and the next
steps in preparing to trigger Article 50.
In receiving Royal Assent, the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act gives the
Government the legal power to notify the European Council of the UK’s intention to leave the EU,
formally beginning the Brexit process.
Sir Tim Barrow, the UK’s Permanent Representative to the European Union, informs Donald Tusk of
the UK’s intention to invoke Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty on 29 March 2017.
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3/29/17

3/30/17
3/31/17
4/29/17

5/18/17
6/17/17
6/19/17

6/21/17
6/23/17
7/13/17

7/14/17
7/20/17
8/15/17
8/16/17
8/21/17

8/22/17
8/28/17

8/31/17
9/5/17
9/12/17

9/22/17

9/25/17

Theresa May writes to European Council President Donald Tusk to notify him of the UK’s intention to
leave the EU: Prime Minister’s letter to Donald Tusk triggering Article 50. The Prime Minister makes
a statement to Parliament on Article 50.
The Government publishes the Great Repeal Bill White Paper. David Davis gives a statement to
Parliament: Legislating for UK Withdrawal from the EU.
The President of the European Council publishes draft negotiation guidelines for the ‘EU 27’ (the EU
members excluding the UK).
EU-27 leaders meet at the first summit since the UK officially triggered Article 50. In this Special
European Council (Article 50), meeting, the EU-27 nations unanimously adopt guidelines for the
Brexit negotiations ahead.
The Conservative Party launches its manifesto for the upcoming General Election.
The government confirms that Parliament will sit for two years instead of the usual one, to give MPs
enough time to fully consider the laws required to make Britain ready for Brexit.
The first round of EU exit negotiations begins. The UK and the European Commission, representing
the EU, agree the Terms of reference for the Article 50 negotiations between the UK and the EU. Later,
David Davis gives a statement following this opening round of the talks.
State Opening of Parliament. The Queen’s Speech includes a ‘Great Repeal Bill’ in the Government’s
legislative program and other Brexit-related Bills.
The Prime Minister gives a press statement on a number of subjects covered at the European Council
June 2017 meeting, including giving reassurance to EU citizens living in the UK.
The Government introduces the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. Ahead of the second round of exit
negotiations the following week, the Government also publishes position papers laying out the UK’s
approach on: Ongoing Union Judicial and Administrative Proceedings, Nuclear materials and
safeguards issues, Privileges and Immunities. The Government publishes a technical note considering
how the UK’s withdrawal agreement with the EU should be implemented in UK law.
The second round of EU exit negotiations begins.
At the conclusion of the second round of talks, David Davis makes a statement.
In the first of a series of papers on the UK’s future partnership with the EU, the Government sets out
proposals for a future customs relationship.
The Government publishes a position paper on Northern Ireland and Ireland, proposing no physical
infrastructure at the border.
Ahead of the third round of exit negotiations, the Government publishes position papers outlining the
UK’s negotiating approach to goods on the market and to confidentiality and access to the official
documents.
The Government publishes a future partnership paper outlining the UK’s position on providing a crossborder civil judicial cooperation framework.
The third round of UK-EU negotiations begins. The Government publishes a series of Technical Notes
on functionality and Protocol 7, on existing contracts for the supply of nuclear material, and on spent
fuel and radioactive waste.
At the conclusion of the third round of exit talks, David Davis gives a statement.
David Davis gives a statement to the House of Commons on EU exit negotiations, updating
Members on the July and August negotiating rounds.
The EU Withdrawal Bill passes Second Reading in the House of Commons. Following the vote, the
Prime Minister says: “Earlier this morning Parliament took a historic decision to back the will of the
British people and vote for a bill which gives certainty and clarity ahead of our withdrawal from the
European Union. Although there is more to do, this decision means we can move on with negotiations
with solid foundations and we continue to encourage MPs from all parts of the UK to work together in
support of this vital piece of legislation.” The Government publishes its latest future partnership paper,
outlining the UK’s objectives on foreign policy, defense and development.
The Prime Minister delivers a key Brexit speech in Florence, setting out the UK’s position on how to
move the Brexit talks forward and offering a transition period after the UK formally leaves the EU in
March 2019.
The fourth round of UK-EU Brexit negotiations begins.
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9/28/17

10/3/17
10/9/17

10/12/17

David Davis gives a statement following the conclusion of the fourth round of talks. The Government
publishes the latest (September) edition of the technical note on the comparison of EU-UK positions on
citizens’ rights.
The European Parliament adopts a Resolution on the state of play of negotiations with the
United Kingdom.
The fifth round of negotiations begins in Brussels. The Prime Minister updates the House of Commons
on UK plans for leaving the EU. The Government publishes two White Papers on preparing for our
future UK trade policy and the Customs Bill: legislating for the UK’s future customs, VAT and excise
regimes.
Following the fifth round of UK-EU negotiations, David Davis gives a statement.

10/16/17

A joint statement is issued by the Prime Minister and President of the European Commission JeanClaude Juncker, following their working dinner in Brussels.

10/17/17

David Davis, Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, gives a statement to Parliament on the
fifth round of negotiations with the EU.

10/20/17

European Council meeting, including EU27 considering whether ‘sufficient progress’ has been made
on phase 1 of the Brexit negotiations

11/9/17

Sixth Round of Brexit Negotiations Begins

11/16/17

David Davis said in his Berlin speech on 16 November “we have made a great deal of progress in the
negotiations to date – far more than is understood by most people”

11/22/17

In his autumn budget report on 22 November Chancellor Philip Hammond announced that to prepare
for leaving the EU and ensure a smooth transition, the Government was setting aside an additional £3
billion.
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